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The year 2018 was a year of anni-
versaries, celebrating decades of politi-
cal independence as well as innovative 
regional institutions.
The University of the South Pacific 
(usp)—one of the Pacific’s most 
important regional initiatives—marked 
its fiftieth anniversary. Over the past 
five decades, it has grown from a 
small campus at Laucala Bay in Suva 
to a multifaceted institution, with 
the Emalus campus in Vanuatu and a 
network of extension centers span-
ning the region. A fiftieth-anniversary 
history documents how the university 
has educated generations of Pacific 
leaders and provided a vital space 
for debate, reflection, and agitation 
(Leckie 2018).
Across the Pacific, countries com-
memorated anniversaries of colo-
nization, independence, or political 
sovereignty. Forum Island Countries 
held birthday celebrations, including 
Nauru (1968), Tuvalu (1978), and 
Solomon Islands (1978). Australia 
marked the 230th anniversary of the 
First Fleet landing on 26 January—
a day mourned as Invasion Day by 
indigenous peoples. With 2018 mark-
ing the twentieth anniversary of the 
1998 Noumea Accord, the French 
dependency of New Caledonia held a 
referendum on self-determination in 
November. Bougainville also marked 
the fortieth anniversary of the creation 
of provincial government in Papua 
New Guinea (PNG), a key step on the 
path toward the islands’ looming inde-
pendence referendum in late 2019.
Pacific Islands Forum (pif) leaders 
met in Nauru in September for their 
annual meeting. Among a bevy of 
outcomes (pifs 2018b), a key state-
ment reframed the regional security 
discussion. The Boe Declaration looks 
to an “expanded concept of security 
inclusive of human security, humani-
tarian assistance, prioritizing environ-
mental security and regional coopera-
tion in building resilience to disasters 
and climate change, including through 
regional cooperation and support” 
(pifs 2018a). While covering a diverse 
range of traditional security issues, an 
unprecedented provision notes that all 
leaders “reaffirm that climate change 
remains the single greatest threat to 
the livelihoods, security and wellbeing 
of the peoples of the Pacific and our 
commitment to progress the imple-
mentation of the Paris Agreement” 
(pifs 2018a).
The challenge now is for donors 
and development partners to refocus 
technical assistance, research, and 
finance on the existential threat of 
 climate change. This will be  difficult 
at a time when traditional security 
 agendas are driving regional debate, 
with Western nations mobilizing 
against Chinese influence in the 
Pacific.
For Smaller Island States (sis) like 
2018 Forum host Nauru and 2019 
host Tuvalu—both with populations 
of around eleven thousand people—
the logistics of these meetings are 
becoming difficult. There are currently 
eighteen Forum Dialogue Partners 
(Canada, the People’s Republic of 
China, Cuba, the European Union, 
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France, Germany, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, 
the United Kingdom, and the United 
States). In addition to the partners, 
the annual meeting is attended by 
representatives of Forum associ-
ate members (Tokelau and newly 
upgraded Wallis and Futuna) as well 
as Forum observers (American Sāmoa, 
the Commonwealth of the Northern 
Mariana Islands, Guam, Timor-Leste, 
the  Commonwealth Secretariat, the 
International Organization for Migra-
tion, the United Nations [UN] Secre-
tariat, the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission, and the World 
Bank). Add in the media, civil  society, 
and business representatives, and 
other entities, and a bed for the night 
is at a premium!
As more global players look to the 
Islands region for diplomatic advan-
tage, they bring their agendas into 
the annual Forum meeting. This can 
crowd out the priorities of Pacific 
Island countries and clash with local 
ways of working. The packed program 
of the meeting, with numerous side 
events, bilateral consultations, and 
press conferences, also places pressure 
on leaders and key Forum staff as they 
rush from session to session.
After the 2018 sis meeting in 
Nauru, sis leaders formally noted 
the “increasing complexities of the 
geopolitical environment as well as 
the increasing interest of traditional 
and non-traditional partners in the 
Blue Pacific and called for the need to 
be provided the space and time to be 
able to discuss issues and priorities of 
shared importance” (pifs 2018e).
These problems may lead to 
changes in the structure of the annual 
meeting, such as shifting the Forum 
Dialogue Partners’ session to earlier 
in the year, alongside the new Forum 
Foreign Ministers Meeting (this may 
be resisted by some major powers, 
who use the occasion to directly influ-
ence presidents and prime ministers). 
In the final Forum communiqué, the 
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 
(pifs) was directed to “work with the 
Forum Troika (Sāmoa, Nauru, and 
Tuvalu) to review the guidelines and 
format of the Pacific Islands Forum 
Meetings” and report back to leaders 
in 2019 (pifs 2018b).
In another significant but largely 
unreported decision, Forum  leaders 
also adopted a new schedule of 
member financial contributions. These 
extra funds will assist the Pacific 
Islands Forum Secretariat to keep 
pace with its growing agenda but also 
slowly increase the independence of 
decision making from donor pressure.
Such pressure was evident through-
out the year, as Pacific Rim geopoli-
tics impinged on Island states. It’s a 
time of significant uncertainty, with 
US President Donald Trump con-
tinuing trade wars with China; the 
United Kingdom and Commonwealth 
unsettled by the Brexit debate; and the 
European Union slowly preparing to 
negotiate a replacement of the 2000 
Cotonou Treaty with African, Carib-
bean, and Pacific countries. States 
across Asia—China, Taiwan, Korea, 
India, and Indonesia—are also provid-
ing new pathways for aid, trade, and 
investment. At the same time, these 
countries are seeking a diplomatic 
quid pro quo, from silence on human 
rights abuses to numbers for UN votes 
or diplomatic support in northern 
hemisphere disputes. 
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In its 2017 Foreign Policy White 
Paper, the Australian Government 
highlighted the importance of a 
“rules-based order.” Canberra aims 
to increase quadrilateral coordination 
between Australia, the United States, 
Japan, and India in order to contain 
China and North Korea, although 
Canberra denies that containment is 
the objective of these strategic part-
nerships (Australian Government 
2017). In line with its anzus allies, 
New  Zealand issued a new Strategic 
Defence Policy Statement that high-
lights the importance of the South 
Pacific (NZ Ministry of Defence 
2018b). Western nations are seeking to 
limit Chinese investment in key sectors 
such as transportation and telecom-
munications (symbolized by the ban 
on investment by Chinese corporation 
Huawei in key projects).
At the Commonwealth Heads 
of Government Meeting in April, 
 Australia lobbied the United King-
dom for renewed activity in the 
Pacific. Britain announced it will 
open  diplomatic missions in Vanu-
atu, Tonga, and Sāmoa, replacing a 
network downgraded in 2005 as the 
United Kingdom formally withdrew 
from the Pacific Community (Anders 
and Cornish 2018).
Japan hosted the eighth in a series 
of triennial Pacific Area Leaders 
Meetings (palm8) in May. The sum-
mit with Island leaders was held in 
Fukushima, the prefecture of Japan’s 
nuclear meltdown. In the final com-
muniqué, there is no mention of 
China, but leaders reaffirmed “a mari-
time order based on the rule of law in 
the Pacific Ocean,” expressed concern 
over Korean nuclear proliferation, and 
supported Japan’s bid for permanent 
membership in the UN Security Coun-
cil (palm 2018). The meeting also saw 
the first participation of new Forum 
members French Polynesia and New 
Caledonia, despite Japanese concern 
over their status as non- self-governing 
territories.
During a May visit to Australia 
and New Caledonia, French Presi-
dent Emmanuel Macron presented 
France as a key strategic partner in 
the Indo-Pacific region, promoting 
a France-Australia-India axis across 
both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. 
This alliance is being used to justify 
ongoing French colonialism in the 
South Pacific and to maintain con-
trol of New Caledonia. French media 
noted that “given the new strategic 
ambition, Noumea is the bridgehead 
for France in its axis with New Delhi 
and Canberra, through which it hopes 
to block Chinese expansion in the 
Pacific” (Hacquemond 2018).
Like the anzus allies, however, 
France is caught between its eco-
nomic ties with China and its security 
agenda. During his visit, President 
Macron welcomed China’s engage-
ment with world markets but stressed 
that the Xi Jinping government must 
operate within the trade and secu-
rity regime established by the West-
ern allies: “What’s important is to 
preserve a rule-based development 
in the region and especially in the 
Indo-Pacific region. It’s to preserve 
the necessary balances in the region” 
(Macron 2018).
Some Island governments are wary 
of the new Indo-Pacific framework, 
seeing this as a Western perspective 
that downplays the Forum’s Blue 
Pacific agenda (Maclellan 2018c). 
Samoan Prime Minister Tuilaepa 
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Sailele Malielegaoi noted: “The 
renewed vigor with which a ‘Free and 
Open Indo-Pacific strategy’ is being 
advocated and pursued leaves us with 
much uncertainty. For the Pacific, 
there is a real risk of privileging 
‘Indo’ over the ‘Pacific’” (Malielegaoi 
2018, 6).
The call for renewed Australian 
and New Zealand engagement in the 
Pacific is often framed as a policy 
of strategic denial, the goal being to 
ensure that Island states do not pro-
vide military access to other powers. 
Conservative think tanks and media 
decry Chinese “debt diplomacy” that 
might be used to leverage strategic 
advantage and establish military bases 
in the Islands (Maclellan 2018h). 
Colonel Greg Colton of the Lowy 
Institute’s South Pacific Fragile States 
Project (funded by the Australian 
Department of Defence) argued that 
Australia should bind Smaller Island 
States to anzus by creating com-
pacts of free association with Nauru, 
Tuvalu, and Kiribati—a neocolonial 
vision that swims against current 
 diplomatic trends (Colton 2018).
In April and May, a series of 
articles in the Sydney Morning Herald 
raised concern about potential Chinese 
military bases in Vanuatu and French 
Polynesia, citing unnamed intelligence 
sources (Wroe 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 
2018d). The suggestion that the 
governments of Vanuatu and China 
had been discussing a military facil-
ity in Luganville was quickly denied 
by Vanuatu Foreign Minister Ralph 
Regenvanu (Maclellan 2018i).
Other Island nations with diplo-
matic ties to Beijing were critical of 
the patronizing tone emanating from 
Canberra and Washington dc, with 
Sāmoa’s prime minister stating: “The 
friendly relations we have with some 
partners are construed by others as 
compromising and obtrusive, prompt-
ing some to speak up for us to ward 
off the influences we are supposedly 
too naive to recognize. By the same 
token, we are given alternatives that 
reflect interests beyond altruism and 
conversion of the poor” (Malielegaoi 
2018, 9).
This debate was played out as 
Taiwan sought to protect its Pacific 
partnerships against expanding Chi-
nese diplomacy. In the early 1990s, 
thirty countries recognized Taipei over 
Beijing, but today this number has 
nearly halved. Internationally, most 
of the seventeen nations that recog-
nize Taiwan are Smaller Island States, 
including six in the Pacific (Nauru, 
Tuvalu, Solomon Islands, Marshall 
Islands, Palau, and Kiribati).
Taiwan is using its relationship 
with Pacific Island countries to lobby 
for UN membership. In September, 
Nauru, Tuvalu, and Palau used similar 
wording in their annual speeches 
at the UN General Assembly, call-
ing on the United Nations to “seek a 
solution to include Taiwan in all its 
processes, including the International 
Civil Aviation Organization and the 
World Health Organization” (see 
also Remengesau 2018; Waqa 2018; 
Sopoaga 2018).
Because Taiwan is not a Forum 
Dialogue Partner, it meets with its six 
Island allies on the sidelines of the 
annual summit. However, in 2018, 
Taiwan provided financial support to 
Nauru for the Forum meeting. Ironi-
cally, although the Taiwanese govern-
ment was not in the room, the sum-
mit was held in a convention center 
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funded by Taipei, and the Forum 
sessions took place on the same floor 
as the Republic of China’s embassy.
Not content with placing restric-
tions on media attending the summit, 
the host government delayed visas for 
China’s official delegation until the 
last minute, arguing that the Chinese 
delegation must travel on personal 
rather than diplomatic passports 
(Maclellan 2018a). This brinkmanship 
brought a sharp rebuke from outgoing 
Forum chair Malielegaoi and expres-
sions of concern from Forum countries 
aligned with Beijing.
In response, Chinese diplomats 
made their concern clear. In an 
unprecedented display, one Chinese 
diplomat demanded to speak out of 
turn during the Forum Dialogue ses-
sion. In front of regional leaders and 
the eighteen dialogue partners, he then 
disputed the ruling to wait his turn 
from Nauru President Baron Divavesi 
Waqa as chair of the session and 
loudly disrupted the meeting, walking 
out of the room.
This clumsy and arrogant mes-
sage angered many Pacific leaders 
and  officials—even those aligned 
with China. Waqa later threatened to 
denounce China before other interna-
tional meetings, causing anxiety for 
Forum staff as to whether he would 
speak as Forum chair or as the presi-
dent of his own nation. The Pacific 
Islands Forum Secretariat walks a 
tightrope between members aligned 
with Beijing and those aligned with 
Taipei: both China and Taiwan pro-
vide an annual grant to the secretariat, 
with Taiwan’s funds often allocated 
toward Forum support for its sis 
members. The China-Taiwan dispute 
will continue into 2019, as Tuvalu—
aligned with Taiwan—hosts the next 
leaders’ meeting.
This ongoing jousting is clearly 
frustrating Forum Secretary-General 
Dame Meg Taylor: “This constant 
to-ing and fro-ing about Taiwan 
and China is a constant distraction. 
I think that there will be a discus-
sion at the leaders meeting on this, in 
terms of how development partners 
are treated across the board. . . . The 
issue that I would like to see is that 
the Pacific Islands Forum can protect 
this space for discussion of the issues 
that are important to the leaders of the 
Pacific, raised by the Pacific countries” 
(Maclellan 2018a).
Despite the Forum dispute, China 
expanded its regional diplomacy 
 during 2018—even in the face of 
pushback from the anzus allies. A 
highlight was President Xi Jinping’s 
official state visit to Papua New 
Guinea, which included participa-
tion in the November Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (apec) sum-
mit hosted by PNG Prime Minister 
Peter O’Neill. The summit provided 
President Xi with a key opportunity 
to bolster its regional relationships, 
with the Chinese leader holding a 
 pre-apec summit with Pacific leaders 
in Port Moresby. The PNG capital was 
covered with Chinese flags to mark 
the arrival of the Chinese president. In 
contrast, the decision by US President 
Donald Trump to miss the meeting 
symbolized US disinterest in multi-
lateral organizations that it cannot 
control.
With a massive security presence 
that was assisted by Australia and 
New Zealand, the O’Neill government 
hoped the summit would raise Papua 
New Guinea’s profile as a place for 
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investment in its oil, gas, and mining 
sectors. There was, however, wide-
spread public debate over the costs of 
the summit and possible benefits for 
PNG citizens (symbolized by criti-
cism of the purchase of Maserati and 
Bentley vehicles to chauffeur the apec 
leaders around Port Moresby).
In an attempt to blunt China’s role, 
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and 
the United States announced an ambi-
tious program to support infrastruc-
ture and electrification in Papua New 
Guinea. With Vice President Mike 
Pence leading the US delegation, there 
were sharp diplomatic exchanges with 
Beijing before and during the sum-
mit. In an unprecedented failure, the 
summit was unable to release a final 
communiqué, with US and Chinese 
diplomats deadlocked over language 
on trade, intellectual property, and 
other issues.
Despite significant exports of 
energy, food, and minerals to China, 
Australia’s conservative coalition 
government has increasingly lined up 
with the US government, expressing 
concern over Chinese interference 
domestically and in the Pacific Islands.
In the face of expanding Chinese 
trade, loans, and soft power, then 
Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull 
announced at the 2016 Forum leaders’ 
meeting that Australia would “step 
up” in the region (Australian Govern-
ment 2018). In November 2018, his 
successor, Scott Morrison, announced 
a series of measures to implement this 
renewed commitment.
Australia will establish embassies 
in all countries and territories that 
currently lack a diplomatic mission 
(Palau, the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands, French Polynesia, Niue, 
and the Cook Islands). As well as a 
regional army training force and new 
police training and financing, the 
government will also establish a new 
Office of the Pacific in the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
The new office is supposed to enhance 
whole-of-government coordination, 
seconding staff from the Australian 
Federal Police, the Department of 
Defence, the Department of Home 
Affairs, and the Attorney-General’s 
Department. The initial lack of staff 
seconded from departments related 
to the environment raises concern that 
the new office, staffed with extra spies 
and soldiers, will be more focused on 
Australia’s national security than on 
the human security agenda expressed 
in the Boe Declaration.
In contrast to Canberra’s policies, 
neighbors like New Zealand, Papua 
New Guinea, Fiji, Sāmoa, and Vanu-
atu are all engaging with President 
Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative. Through 
this global infrastructure program, 
China will use loans, grants, and 
investments from Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, Exim Bank, and 
private corporations to boost regional 
infrastructure.
In response, at the November apec 
summit, Australia joined Japan and 
the United States in a Trilateral Part-
nership for Infrastructure Investment 
in the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s Export 
Finance and Insurance Corporation, 
the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation, and the US Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation will 
work together to mobilize private-
sector funding for infrastructure and 
energy projects across the Indo-Pacific 
region.
The Morrison government also 
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plans to commit a$2 billion (a$1 mil-
lion = us$716,000) to an Australian 
Infrastructure Financing Facility for 
the Pacific, with a$1.5 billion in loans 
and a$500 million in grants. Morrison 
also committed a further a$1 billion 
for the Export Finance and Insurance 
Corporation to create “a new more 
flexible infrastructure financing power 
to support investments in the region 
which have a broad national benefit 
for Australia” (Morrison 2018).
The government also extended 
access to Australia’s Seasonal Worker 
Program and its Pacific Labor Scheme. 
Between 2012 and 2017, the Seasonal 
Worker Program involved 17,320 
Pacific Islanders and delivered approx-
imately a$144 million in net income 
gains to the region. In February, the 
World Bank released a report on pos-
sible reforms to extend and enhance 
the scheme (World Bank 2018).
Labor mobility presents a major 
opportunity for remittance flows to 
most Forum Island Countries. But the 
development gains from labor mobil-
ity are subject to the unilateral deci-
sions of Australia and New Zealand. 
The 2017 Pacific Agreement on Closer 
Economic Relations (pacer)–Plus 
trade agreement only includes legally 
binding commitments on labor market 
access for skilled and professional 
workers. A separate arrangement on 
labor mobility covers lower-skilled 
workers, with no legally binding 
commitments for labor market access 
(Kautoke-Holani 2018). The only 
commitment relating to market access 
liberalization is the establishment of a 
Pacific Labor Mobility Annual Meet-
ing. The second of these meetings was 
hosted in Solomon Islands in October.
During the year, there were ongoing 
debates about potential costs from the 
pacer-Plus trade agreement. A report 
by the Australian Joint Standing Com-
mittee on Treaties noted: “The absence 
of Papua New Guinea and Fiji from 
pacer-Plus significantly diminishes the 
utility of the agreement for Australian 
business” (jsct 2018, para 3.21). The 
committee found that “Pacific Island 
nations already have tariff free access 
to Australia and New Zealand for 
their exports, so all tariff reductions 
and consequent market access benefits 
will flow to Australia and New Zea-
land” (jsct 2018, para 3.26).
Before further Australian initiatives 
can be rolled out, there will likely be 
a new government in Canberra, with 
elections held on 18 May 2019. Opin-
ion polling suggests that the opposi-
tion Australian Labor Party (alp) will 
win government. In a keynote foreign 
policy speech in October, alp leader 
Bill Shorten stated: “A Labor Govern-
ment will put the Pacific front and 
center in our regional foreign policy. 
We’re not going to forfeit the Pacific 
because we didn’t turn up. Labor 
will reconstitute the role of Minister 
for Pacific Affairs and International 
Development that the new Prime Min-
ister has recently relegated to Assistant 
Minister status” (Shorten 2018).
After Prime Minister Morrison 
failed to attend the 2018 Forum lead-
ers’ meeting, he made a flying visit 
to Vanuatu and Fiji in January 2019. 
But Australia’s desire to be seen as 
the partner of choice in the Pacific is 
undercut by successive governments’ 
weak targets on reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions. Island nations also 
oppose Australia’s plans to expand 
coal exports to Asia. Frequent pater-
nalist statements by senior politicians 
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have angered many Pacific citizens. 
Morrison described the Pacific as 
“our patch” (Morrison 2018), while 
in August, Environment Minister 
Melissa Price met former Kiribati 
President Anote Tong in Canberra and 
reportedly told the climate champion: 
“I know why you’re here. It’s for the 
cash. For the Pacific, it’s all about the 
cash. I have my cheque book here, 
how much do you want?” (Murphy 
2018).
Islands Business magazine edito-
rialized: “The Pacific people are not 
beggars. By her comments, Price has 
implied that the region is lined up at 
the doors to Australia’s Treasury, cap 
in hand, waiting for freebies. Nothing 
could be further from the truth. . . . 
The region does not want handouts 
from Australia. What we want is a 
reduction in carbon emissions so that 
global warming is reduced and the 
Pacific can fight climate change. What 
we want is Australia’s support in the 
battle against global warming through 
a reduction in the sale of coal and the 
eventual closure of its mines” (Islands 
Business 2018).
As a matter of global justice, 
 however, Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 
member countries like Australia and 
the United States have an obliga-
tion to contribute increased climate 
finance through bilateral programs 
and  multilateral mechanisms like 
the Green Climate Fund (gcf). With 
the  exception of large nations like 
Papua New Guinea and Fiji, many 
Pacific Island countries receive limited 
amounts of foreign direct investment. 
For this reason, they rely on overseas 
public finance to complement local 
taxation and import duties that will 
now be wound down under pacer-
Plus.
Despite their pledges of commit-
ment to the region in 2018, both 
the Trump administration and the 
 Morrison government refused to 
allocate new funding for the Green 
Climate Fund beyond amounts 
already paid by previous governments. 
With elections looming, the Austra-
lian Labor Party’s Shadow Foreign 
 Minister Penny Wong pledged that an 
incoming Labor government would 
join New Zealand’s government to 
increase overseas aid and climate 
finance, stressing that “you can’t have 
a Pacific policy if you don’t have a 
climate change policy” (Wong 2018).
The NZ coalition government led 
by Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern 
has already moved to “reset” policy 
toward the Pacific Islands. Ardern 
used a February foreign policy address 
to state that in the Pacific “we can do 
better, and we will” (2018). Climate 
action is a key element of this policy 
shift, with the release of a paper in 
May on Pacific climate change–related 
displacement and migration (NZ 
 Government 2018b). Later in the 
year, the New Zealand Defence Force 
launched a new report on how climate 
change will affect defense readiness 
(NZ Ministry of Defence 2018a).
At their pre-Forum caucus in 
 September, sis leaders called on 
“members of the international com-
munity to urgently accelerate the 
achievements of greenhouse gas reduc-
tions to limiting global temperature 
rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius” and “for 
the urgent resolution and adoption of 
the rule book of the Paris Agreement” 
(pifs 2018e). In an unprecedented 
gesture, all Forum member countries 
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(with one exception) then endorsed 
rather than simply noted these sis 
outcomes. At the final press confer-
ence, Tuvalu Prime Minister Enele 
Sopoaga declined to name the country 
expressing qualifications over the need 
for urgent action on emissions, but he 
did acknowledge that it begins with 
a capital A. In the resulting laughter, 
everyone recognized that this did not 
mean Aotearoa but rather the largest 
Forum member (Maclellan 2018g).
Despite the reactionary climate 
policies emanating from Canberra 
and Washington dc, and the limited 
emissions reduction targets negotiated 
at global climate conferences, Pacific 
communities are getting on with the 
job.
The damage caused by cyclones and 
other disasters is seen as a key eco-
nomic issue in the region. The 2018 
Forum Economic Ministers’ Meeting 
debated two proposals to risk-proof 
infrastructural assets. The first is a 
Pacific Resilience Facility, designed as 
a regional fund to help Pacific govern-
ments, private sector businesses, and 
communities to invest in resilience ini-
tiatives. The second is a Pacific Island 
Countries’ Climate Change Insurance 
Facility, intended especially for Smaller 
Island States that cannot afford 
the expensive insurance premiums 
required to protect public infrastruc-
ture from extreme weather events.
As part of its Talanoa program on 
climate change throughout 2018—an 
international series of informal discus-
sions on climate solutions—Fiji hosted 
the Suva Expert Dialogue on Loss 
and Damage Associated with Climate 
Change Impacts in May (Government 
of Fiji 2018). New Zealand and some 
Pacific states also joined the Powering 
Past Coal Alliance, looking to reduce 
fossil fuel subsidies for new coal 
and gas exploration. Internationally, 
Sāmoa and New Zealand joined other 
mid-level nations to form Friends of 
Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (mfat 
2018).
Throughout 2018, Forum Island 
Countries maintained a strong and 
successful focus on accessing and 
managing climate finance. Over the 
last five years, Island nations have 
been using the Pacific Islands Climate 
Finance Assessment Framework to 
determine their resource needs and 
develop efficient ways to manage large 
inflows of finance. Despite ongo-
ing problems with accessing global 
funding mechanisms, this work on the 
ground has led to positive results.
The Cook Islands has successfully 
applied for status as an accredited 
National Implementing Entity for 
both the Global Climate Fund and 
the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund, 
becoming the only Pacific country to 
obtain direct-access funding. Sāmoa 
has become the most successful coun-
try in accessing bilateral and multilat-
eral climate finance, and Tonga won 
approval for its first tranche of gcf 
funding in 2018. There is a major 
focus on public finance management, 
with Kiribati and Solomon Islands 
establishing new climate finance units 
within their ministries of finance (pifs 
2018c).
At year’s end, Pacific governments 
traveled to Katowice, Poland, for the 
twenty-fourth Conference of the Par-
ties (cop24) of the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change. A 
key outcome was the adoption of 
a  rulebook to implement the Paris 
Agreement on Climate Change, 
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although there was limited progress 
in reducing emissions, with most 
countries refusing to announce new, 
stronger targets.
On 8 October, just before cop24, 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change released a long-awaited 
special report titled “Global Warm-
ing of 1.5°C.” The scientific report 
detailed the effects of a temperature 
rise of 1.5 degrees Celsius above 
preindustrial levels, stressing that the 
achievement of this target is possible 
but would require “deep emissions 
reductions” and “rapid, far-reaching 
and unprecedented changes in all 
aspects of society” (ipcc 2018, 6). 
The report stressed the particular 
dangers for Small Island Developing 
States (sids) and Least Developed 
Countries that are more vulnerable to 
the adverse effects of climate change.
Fiji Ambassador to Brussels Deo 
Saran noted the achievements for the 
Pacific as his country ended its year-
long presidency of cop23: “Our voice 
is getting stronger and our influence 
is growing. Built on recent years of 
hard work, the very fact that a Pacific 
island nation, a Small Island Devel-
oping State and a climate-vulnerable 
state held the presidency gave us all 
an opportunity we never had before. 
Finally, after 25 years, the Pacific 
islands were at the very forefront of 
the discussions. The risks we face were 
laid bare as never before. The focus on 
limiting warming to 1.5 degrees was 
unprecedented” (Fiji Sun 2018).
These advances, however, are 
undercut by the actions of the Trump 
administration, with its ongoing 
decision to withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement and its refusal to com-
mit the remaining us$2 billion of the 
Obama administration’s us$3 billion 
pledge to the Global Climate Fund.
The United States tried to show its 
commitment to the Islands by send-
ing a large delegation to the Nauru 
Forum, led by Secretary of the Interior 
Ryan Zinke. However, in the Trump 
administration, Zinke has worked to 
promote fossil fuels and roll back US 
federal environmental regulations. 
Rather than just attend the Forum 
Dialogue meeting with other Forum 
Dialogue Partners, the United States 
lobbied to host a separate breakfast 
with Forum leaders. This power play 
did not work. The final communiqué 
states that “leaders of Forum Island 
Countries called on the United States 
to return to the Paris Agreement on 
Climate Change” (pifs 2018b).
During his September tour of the 
region, Zinke visited the US territory 
of Guam to meet outgoing Governor 
Eddie Calvo. Within weeks, however, 
the Interior secretary announced that 
he would stand down from the Trump 
cabinet following a series of allega-
tions of impropriety and conflict of 
interest.
Zinke’s resignation was one of 
many from the Trump administration 
as the US Democrats took control 
of the House of Representatives in 
November’s midterm elections. Guam 
elected Democrat Michael San Nico-
las as its nonvoting delegate in the 
US Congress, while Republican Eddie 
Baza Calvo stepped down as governor 
of Guam and was replaced by Demo-
crat Lou Leon Guerrero, the island’s 
first female governor.
From the start of 2018, many 
people were jangled by US–North 
Korea sabre rattling (including a false 
alert of a nuclear attack on Hawai‘i on 
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13 January, which panicked citizens 
and highlighted the danger of inad-
vertent nuclear conflict). The Trump 
administration’s funding for new 
nuclear weapons clashed with the 
current mood among New Zealanders 
and many Island nations, who seek to 
address the radioactive contamination 
from Cold War nuclear weapons test-
ing. There is also concern about the 
ongoing hazard of unexploded ord-
nance and toxic leakage from vessels 
sunk during the US advance across the 
Pacific in World War II (pifs 2011).
At regional meetings, Republic of 
the Marshall Islands (RMI) President 
Hilda Heine highlighted the leakage of 
nuclear contaminants from the Runit 
Dome on Enewetak Atoll (abc 2017). 
The connection between sea-level rise 
and nuclear contamination on Runit 
was vividly portrayed in “Anointed,” 
a 2018 poem by Kathy Jetn̄il-Kijiner. 
At their meeting in September, sis 
leaders agreed that the issue of radio-
active contaminants will be a stand-
alone agenda item during future 
meetings.
In a stunning statement to the 
French Polynesian Assembly in 
November, President Edouard Fritch 
admitted that successive governments 
led by Gaston Flosse had lied about 
the health and environmental effects 
of thirty years of French nuclear test-
ing: “For 30 years we lied to people 
that these tests were clean. It was us 
who lied and I was a member of this 
gang! And for what reason did we lie? 
Because our own leader had seen a 
bomb explode” (Zweifel 2018).
These nuclear threats have led to an 
important response from many Forum 
countries: the signing or ratification 
of the new Treaty on the Prohibi-
tion of Nuclear Weapons. The treaty 
includes unprecedented provisions on 
assistance for the survivors of nuclear 
testing, a key concern for countries 
like Australia, Kiribati, the Republic 
of the Marshall Islands, and French 
Polynesia that suffered more than 
three hundred nuclear tests during the 
Cold War.
Pacific nongovernmental organi-
zations (ngos) and governments 
played a crucial role in negotiating 
the treaty (Bolton 2018). On 3 May, 
Palau became the first Pacific country 
to ratify it, followed by New Zealand 
(31 July), Cook Islands (accession on 
4 September), Sāmoa (26 September), 
and Vanuatu (26 September). The 
2018 Forum communiqué formally 
welcomed these ratifications, even 
though Australia has long opposed 
the treaty and refuses to sign it (pifs 
2018b).
Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Timor-
Leste have already signed the treaty 
and are considering ratification, with 
other Island states pledging to follow. 
From nuclear-free Vanuatu, Prime 
Minister Charlot Salwai expressed 
solidarity: “The small island states 
of the Pacific—notably our brothers 
and sisters in the states of Micro-
nesia—continue to be exposed to 
ongoing threat arising from radioac-
tive contamination, alongside unex-
ploded ordinance [sic] and relics of 
the  Second World War. Therefore we 
call on all states to join us to ratify the 
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons” (Salwai 2018).
At the invitation of NZ Prime 
Minister Ardern, twelve government 
delegations from around the region 
came together in Auckland from 5 to 
7 December to take stock of the treaty 
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from a regional perspective. With US 
Compact of Free Association states 
the Federated States of Micronesia 
(FSM) and the Republic of the Mar-
shall Islands concerned about their 
legal capacity to sign the treaty (ihrc 
2018), the meeting assessed the trea-
ty’s prospects for advancing nuclear 
disarmament and global security and 
how to work toward its entry into 
force (NZ Government 2018a).
This collective diplomacy for 
nuclear disarmament comes at a time 
of growing tensions between the 
United States and China. However, 
Pacific Island governments are increas-
ingly forging their own diplomatic 
paths, with RMI President Heine 
noting: “We welcome engagement 
with the world’s largest powers—but 
they must have our best island inter-
ests at heart” (Heine 2018). The new 
Pacific diplomacy led many govern-
ments to look to other international 
mechanisms to advance their agendas, 
from the Non-Aligned Movement, the 
Group of 77 and China, and the Alli-
ance of Small Island States to a range 
of UN institutions.
There is a particular focus on 
UN reform, as RMI President Heine 
explained: “Small nations can have 
a unique role within the multilateral 
system. We would not have the UN 
Law of the Sea or the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and a 
great many other outcomes—but for 
the political will of Small Island Devel-
oping States. We are a quarter of this 
body’s membership” (Heine 2018).
The theme of the September 2018 
session of the seventy-third UN Gen-
eral Assembly was “making the United 
Nations relevant to all people.” UN 
Secretary-General António Guterres 
has announced an ambitious program 
of reform of the UN development 
 system in order to achieve the objec-
tives of the Sustainable Development 
Goals by 2030. This review is an 
opportunity seized by Small Island 
Developing States, which are often 
disadvantaged by the United Nations’ 
notoriously bureaucratic and top-
heavy structure.
Throughout 2018, the Pacific 
Islands Forum and individual govern-
ments sought to advance the region’s 
Blue Pacific agenda on climate, oceans, 
and resource management. Tuvalu 
Prime Minister Sopoaga argued: “We 
believe that all UN Agencies should 
identify and develop special programs 
for sids” (Sopoaga 2018, 5).
Meeting the UN secretary-general 
on 28 September in New York, Forum 
leaders took their wish list directly to 
the top. Forum leaders have proposed 
changes to the UN Security Council 
agenda, improved UN representation 
in the Pacific, and better liaison with 
the UN agencies based in Geneva.
Pacific governments have long 
argued that the UN Security Council 
needs reform in order to look beyond 
traditional state-centered security 
priorities. In line with the Boe Decla-
ration, the leaders called on the UN 
secretary-general to appoint a special 
adviser on climate change and security 
in order to strengthen the global focus 
on climate change as a security risk. 
FSM President Peter Christian said: 
“We find it deeply troubling that the 
threat posed by climate change to our 
existence has not received the Secu-
rity Council’s serious consideration” 
(2018). Solomon Islands Prime Min-
ister Rick Houenipwela also argued 
that Small Island Developing States 
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must have a direct voice on the UN 
Security Council through a dedicated 
seat in the non-permanent rotation 
 (Houenipwela 2018, 11).
During their meeting, Island 
leaders presented Guterres with the 
first  Quadrennial Pacific Sustainable 
Development Report, highlighting 
progress on meeting the Sustainable 
Development Goals. They called for 
UN headquarters support for the 
upcoming midterm review of the sids 
Accelerated Modalities of Action 
Pathway (the framework on sustain-
able development adopted at the third 
global sids summit, held in Sāmoa in 
2016).
As part of the current UN review, 
the UN Secretariat will study the 
role of multicountry offices. With 
the United Nations’ multicountry 
 representation in Suva, Apia, and 
Port Moresby, there is no full-time 
resident representative in many 
Smaller Island States, particularly in 
the northern Pacific. Pacific leaders 
called for a strengthened role for UN 
country teams and improvements to 
the resident coordinator system, along 
with setting up UN permanent offices 
across the region.
RMI President Heine told the UN 
General Assembly: “Our present UN 
Resident Coordinator is not a resident 
at all, and faces an impossible task to 
effectively serve 10 remote nations at 
once. I look forward to the upcom-
ing review of the UN’s multi-country 
offices, mandated in resolution 
72/279, and urge innovate solutions” 
(Heine 2018, 2).
Pacific governments also moved to 
strengthen their representation with 
UN agencies in Geneva. Twenty years 
ago, the Forum established a “Perma-
nent Delegation of the Pacific Islands 
Forum to the World Trade Organiza-
tion.” In May 2018, Mere Falemaka, 
the pif permanent representative to 
the World Trade Organization, was 
credentialed to expand her role in 
Geneva. Through her appointment as 
observer to the UN Office in Geneva, 
Falemaka’s role will now extend to 
incorporate all UN agencies and other 
international organizations in the 
Swiss city.
With Fiji’s former UN Ambassador 
Peter Thomson serving as the UN 
special envoy for the ocean, Pacific 
governments are also advancing their 
agenda under the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea.
As a priority, the Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community and the Forum 
Fisheries Agency (ffa) have been 
working with national governments 
to negotiate solutions to maritime 
boundary disputes. At the 2018 
Forum, pif Secretary-General Taylor 
noted: “Out of the 47 boundaries that 
need to be settled, we have completed 
33. We’ve been having conversations 
directly with leaders about the out-
standing maritime boundaries that 
need to be brought to conclusion, 
so we can have greater ownership of 
our region” (Maclellan 2018e). With 
Paris finally agreeing to start nego-
tiations, there has been some prog-
ress in the long-deadlocked conflict 
between France and Vanuatu over 
Umaenupne  (Matthew) and Umaeneag 
(Hunter) islands, whose sovereignty 
have been disputed since Vanuatu’s 
 independence.
Regional fisheries management 
can only work if it extends beyond 
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existing Exclusive Economic Zones 
(eezs). For this reason, Pacific diplo-
mats participated in the first intergov-
ernmental conference to negotiate a 
legally  binding instrument under the 
UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea concerning areas of biodiversity 
beyond national jurisdiction. This 
change to the convention is designed 
to stop illegal activities in the many 
pockets of high seas located between 
national zones and to assist the 
 conservation of marine diversity in 
these areas.
Fiji and Sweden cohosted the first 
UN Oceans Conference in 2017, and 
Portugal will host the next global 
conference in 2020. In preparation, 
Palau will host the Our Oceans 2020 
Conference, with President Tommy 
Remengesau noting: “We need to 
identify our priorities and catalyze 
new coalitions so that the year 2020 
comes to be remembered as a year of 
action” (Remengesau 2018, 3). With 
support from a dozen countries and 
UN  Special Envoy Thomson, Palau 
and Norway launched the High-
Level Panel for a Sustainable Ocean 
 Economy.
In March 2018, the eight Pacific 
leaders of the Parties to the Nauru 
Agreement (pna) met in the Marshall 
Islands, the first pna leaders’ summit 
since 2010. The summit celebrated 
a number of achievements, such as 
the renewal of Marine Stewardship 
Council certification for free-school 
skipjack and yellowfin purse seine 
fisheries. Leaders noted the increase 
in revenues through improvements 
to the Vessel Day Scheme, scientific 
research on tuna stocks, and better 
monitoring of illegal, unreported, 
and unregulated (iuu) fishing. Given 
this agenda, the pna is expanding 
staffing and has contracted for a new 
office to be built in Majuro. 
pna leaders agreed to pursue legal 
recognition of the defined maritime 
baselines established under the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
They want these data points that 
establish the boundaries of current 
Exclusive Economic Zones to remain 
in perpetuity, regardless of the impacts 
of sea-level rise. pna ceo Ludwig 
Kumoru noted: “We want to make 
sure that even if their land disappears 
that they don’t lose their eez. . . . We 
want to make sure that the bound-
aries are protected today so in years 
to come even if people migrate some-
where else that is still their eez and 
they still have licenses and support 
their people where ever they are going 
to be” (Ligaiula 2018).
Island leaders also launched a 
regional initiative for an iuu-free 
Pacific in order to eradicate illegal 
fishing from the region, with RMI 
President Heine noting: “Enhanced 
efforts on illegal fishing are needed 
by Regional Fisheries Management 
Organizations, and we should not be 
afraid to name and shame the worst 
offenders” (Heine 2018, 3).
A key change in regional leadership 
came at the Forum Fisheries Ministers 
Meeting in the Cook Islands in July 
with the retirement of James Movick, 
director-general of the Forum Fisher-
ies Agency (ffa). His replacement is 
Dr Manumatavai Tupou-Roosen of 
Tonga, who previously served as ffa 
legal counsel (Volau 2018). Forum 
Secretary-General Taylor welcomed 
the unanimous decision of Pacific gov-
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ernments to appoint the first woman 
to lead the agency: “I am very proud 
that a daughter of the Blue Pacific has 
been appointed Director General. . . . 
I have to say that I am also extremely 
proud of the fact that another woman 
is sitting in a key leadership position 
within the region” (pifs 2018d).
At the Forum in September, Aus-
tralian Foreign Minister Marise Payne 
and Cook Islands Prime Minister 
Henry Puna unveiled one of two 
new aircraft for aerial surveillance 
of Pacific maritime zones, funded by 
 Australia’s Pacific Maritime Surveil-
lance Program. To support real-time 
monitoring of maritime threats, 
Payne also announced funding for a 
a$17.7 million Pacific Fusion  Centre, 
“to share information in relation to 
threats, in relation to operational 
activities of their own law enforce-
ment agencies or their patrol activities. 
So we are working as closely together 
as possible to identify and defeat 
these criminal challenges” (Maclellan 
2018b).
In December, pna and ffa repre-
sentatives lobbied hard at the Western 
and Central Pacific Fisheries Com-
mission (wcpfc) annual meeting. The 
Pacific representatives worked to resist 
pressure from the United States to 
increase its quota for bigeye tuna (afp 
2018), and they sought expanded par-
ticipation for Small Island Developing 
States in the work of the commission.
Increasing numbers of Islanders 
are currently working in the local and 
regional fishing industry, with nearly 
twenty-three thousand employees 
across the region. As well as crew on 
fishing vessels, eight hundred fisher-
ies observers aboard purse seiners, 
and other maritime workers, there 
are fifteen thousand tuna processing 
jobs in fish canning factories, provid-
ing employment for many women. 
For the first time, the wcpfc adopted 
minimum labor standards for crew on 
fishing vessels, with pna ceo Kumoru 
stating: “We are promoting action in 
support of human rights for fishers 
working in our fishery and that go to 
addressing concerns about trafficking 
in people and other illicit activities” 
(pna 2018).
Beyond the Blue Pacific agenda, a 
central regional concern was resource 
management. Alongside long-standing 
investment in Papua New Guinea’s 
Ramu nickel project, Chinese state-
owned and private companies have 
undertaken new projects in 2018. 
Tahiti Nui Océan Foods, a subsidiary 
of the Tianrui Group Co Ltd, will 
invest us$300 million in an aquacul-
ture project on Hao Atoll in French 
Polynesia, which hosts a long airstrip 
and infrastructure previously used as a 
staging post for French nuclear testing. 
New Caledonia’s Société Minière du 
Sud Pacifique (smsp) mining com-
pany and Northern Province develop-
ment arm, Sofinor, hold a 51 percent 
ownership of a joint venture with 
Yangzhou Yichuan Nickel Industry 
Co Ltd. In March, smsp agreed to 
deliver 600,000 tonnes of nickel ore 
to  Yichuan each year for the next 
twenty-five years after the Chinese 
corporation agrees to sell 51 percent 
of its share capital to smsp (Maclellan 
forthcoming).
In the lead-up to the November 
apec summit, Chinese businessmen 
also approached John Momis, presi-
dent of the Autonomous Bougainville 
Government, to invest in the giant 
Panguna gold and copper mine, previ-
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ously operated by Bougainville Copper 
Ltd (Matsumoto 2018). Papua New 
Guinea’s National Research Institute 
published research fiscal alterna-
tives for Bougainville, complemented 
by ngo research on alternatives to 
mining through promotion of perma-
culture and agricultural exports (nri 
2018; Jubilee 2018).
There is growing pressure from 
French and US corporations to 
advance the deep-sea mining agenda, 
as well as growing interest in deep-sea 
mining from the China Ocean Mineral 
Resources Research and Development 
Association (Zhang 2018). Nautilus 
Minerals has long planned to mine 
seabed minerals beneath Papua New 
Guinea’s Bismarck Sea. However, 
with community resistance, falling 
share prices, and the apparent loss of 
a  specialized support vessel,  Nautilus 
has pushed out commencement of 
mining beyond 2019 (Economist 
2018).
Governments in the region also 
pledged their support for human 
rights, with Fiji taking up a position 
on the UN Human Rights Council 
in 2018 with former Fiji High Court 
Judge Nazhat Shameem appointed as 
vice president of the council. The RMI 
government announced its intention 
to bid for a seat on the Human Rights 
Council from 2020 (Heine 2018).
With nongovernmental organi-
zations actively debating the costs 
and benefits of government policy, 
they often found that politicians and 
officials were wary of media cover-
age that might limit investment in 
resource projects or expose corruption 
or mismanagement. Throughout the 
year, there was renewed debate over 
the uses and abuses of social media, 
issues of government transparency, 
and media rights and responsibilities.
Despite official public commitment 
to accountability, there were worrying 
incidents of harassment of journalists 
across the region, including the assault 
of journalists in Papua New Guinea, 
changes to the role and position of key 
journalists at the Tonga Broadcasting 
Commission, and the reintroduction 
of libel laws in Sāmoa (Maclellan 
2018f).
In February, editor Samisoni Pareti 
of Islands Business magazine, journal-
ist Nanise Volau, and former pub-
lisher Netani Rika were questioned 
by police following publication of 
an article about judicial rulings on 
a long-running industrial dispute. 
Police seized phones and computers 
and recommended that the journal-
ists face serious charges under Fiji’s 
Public Order Act (Fiji Times 2018), 
although prosecutors later declined to 
proceed. In May, a Fiji court acquit-
ted four people charged with sedition 
and other serious offenses after the 
2016 publication of a malicious letter 
in the Fijian-language newspaper Nai 
Lalakai, part of the Fiji Times group 
(Maclellan 2018f).
In recent years, Nauru and Aus-
tralia have used a nonrefundable visa 
application fee of us$5,000 for jour-
nalists seeking to visit Nauru. In line 
with standard practice, Nauru waived 
this visa fee for accredited journalists 
at the September Forum. However, it 
limited the number of media workers 
who could attend, banned  reporters 
from the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation, and introduced unprec-
edented restrictions on the stories 
journalists could cover outside the 
formal Forum agenda. Television New 
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Zealand journalist Barbara Dreaver 
was briefly detained by police after 
talking with a refugee (Maclellan 
2018d). 
Given the limited opportunities for 
dissent and dialogue through tradi-
tional media and information chan-
nels, social media has enabled activists 
to exert pressure on policymakers 
from the bottom up. Some politicians 
are angered by popular use of social 
media to challenge (or defame) them, 
with an unsuccessful proposal from 
PNG politician Sam Basil to suspend 
Facebook’s operations in Papua New 
Guinea and the introduction of Fiji’s 
Online Safety Act 2018 (Kant and oth-
ers 2018; Tarai 2018).
The core human right—the right to 
self-determination—was also on the 
regional agenda. Under the twenty-
year transition established by the 
1998 Noumea Accord, the French 
dependency of New Caledonia held 
its referendum on self-determination 
on 4 November. In an unprecedented 
turnout, 56.67 percent of voters 
decided to remain within the French 
Republic, while 43.33 percent voted 
for independence.
These figures, with a clear majority 
opposing full sovereignty, suggest a 
setback for New Caledonia’s indepen-
dence coalition, Front de Libération 
Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (flnks). 
In reality, the size of the pro-indepen-
dence vote has disheartened partisans 
of the French Republic. Just days after 
the referendum, flnks spokesperson 
Daniel Goa stated: “We lost on the 
numbers, but for us it’s a victory. For 
the Kanak people, the first people, this 
is a great victory, as we have loudly 
and clearly expressed our perspec-
tive without ambiguity and without 
recourse. Who now will contest the 
justice of our struggle, who now 
will challenge our very existence?” 
(Maclellan 2019).
The likely balance of forces after 
the next Provincial Assembly and 
Congressional elections in May 2019 
will open the way for a second refer-
endum in 2020, which can be called 
by a third of the members of the new 
Congress. A late 2020 vote will come 
soon after Bougainville’s  referendum 
on self-determination, which is 
scheduled to be held during the twelve 
months following June 2019.
The synergy of two referenda in 
close proximity—along with ongoing 
agitation for independence in West 
Papua—will pose significant problems 
for the Melanesian Spearhead Group 
(msg) and the Pacific Islands Forum, 
given opposition to independence in 
Port Moresby and Canberra (Maclel-
lan and Regan 2018). Throughout 
the year, Indonesian forces contin-
ued human rights abuses in West 
Papua, while the Vanuatu government 
pledged to take a resolution to the UN 
General Assembly in 2019 seeking re-
inscription for West Papua on the UN 
list of non-self-governing territories.
There was international monitoring 
of New Caledonia’s referendum cam-
paign and polling day, with the United 
Nations sending a team of thirteen 
electoral experts; a Forum ministe-
rial mission with representatives from 
Nauru, Vanuatu, and Sāmoa; and a 
support team from the Melanesian 
Spearhead Group, led by msg Director-
General Ambassador Amena Yauvoli. 
The Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 
also continued its tradition of sending 
monitoring missions for parliamentary 
elections around the region, including 
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French Polynesia in May and Cook 
Islands in June. India, Indonesia, and 
Australia led a Multinational Observa-
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